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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL K. MILLIGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF
OGDEN, a corporation, and SAFEWAY
STORES, INC., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Inasmuch as the defendant, Coca Cola Bottling
Company of Ogden, controverts some important particulars of appellant's statement of facts, it becOines
necessary that this defendant and respondent make its
own statement of facts as required by Rule 75(p)(2).
In defendant's staternent, references to the Deposition
of the plaintiff, which is a part of the record, will be
made by a "D."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Pleadings. Plaintiff's complaint (R 1-3) seeks
damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained as a result of a paper clip coming out of a bottle
of Coca Cola and lodging in his throat. It is alleged that
plaintiff purchased the Coca Cola frorn defendant,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Safeway Stores, which had in turn previously purchased
the same from the defendant Bottling Company. Under
Rule 8(e), U.R.C.P., plaintiff in one count alleged, or
attempted to allege three statements of his claim: one
for sale of an adulterated product in violation of 8ection 4-20-5, U.C.A., 1953 (Paragraph VI), one for breach
of an implied warranty of fitness for use and merchantability (Paragraph VII), and one for negligence, both
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor (Paragraph VIII)
and generally (Paragraph IX).
It is to be observed that nowhere in the attempted
statement of a claim for breach of implied warranty
(Paragraph VII), and nowhere else in the Complaint,
is there any allegation of the giving of notice to defendants, or either of them, of th'e claimed breach of
warranty as required by Section 60-3-9, U.C.A., 1953.

Plaintiff's Deposition. The deposition of the plaintiff was taken under the rules relating to discovery.
The deposition developed the following facts.
The plaintiff lives in a private dwelling house in
Ogden, Utah. Two or three days prior to his birthday
on February 2, 1959, plaintiff purchased two cartons
of Coca Cola, small size, from a Safeway Self-service
Store on Twenty-fourth Str'eet in Ogden. (D 12-14, 46)
He picked up the two cartons from a stack against the
East wall close to the South corner of the store. (D 1314) He took the two cartons of Coca Cola to his home
and placed them on the floor in the fruit-romn. (D 1516) The fruit-room is a separate room at the rear, and
opening out of the garage for his private automobile,
which garage is built as an integral part of the dwelling
2
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house. There is a door from the kitchen into the garage and fron1 the garage into the fruit-room. The door
between the garage and the fruit-room has no lock thereon; only a latch. (D 10-12, 16, Exhibit 1 attached to
the Deposition).
Plaintiff drinks cokes quite regularly and since the
purchase in question has purchased Coca Cola from other
sources. (D 14-15).
The garage has an overhead door that swings up.
On some occasions the garage door is left open. (D 12).
Plaintiff's married daughter lives next door and she
and her husband visit back and forth a good deal. (D 27).
There are children and teenagers living in the immediate
neighborhood. (D 28).
On February 27th, two or three days after the purchase, the plaintiff had a birthday party. Most of the
Coca Cola purchased at Safeway Stores was consumed
at the party. The empty bottles were placed back in
the garage in the carton. At the party the Coca Cola
was taken out of the fruit-room and placed on the
drainboard. (D 40, D 44). The party lasted three or
four hours and the family guests were free to go out
and pick up Coca Cola and open them at will. ( D45 ).
Plaintiff's wife also shops for Coca Cola, but gets
it from another store. (D 41). However, the plaintiff
does not personally remember buying small size bottles
on any other occasion. (D 41).
The bottle in question, which had been removed
frmn the carton at the time of the birthday party, was
placed back on the floor of the fruit-room behind the
garage and remained there, so far as the plaintiff knows,
3
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until the time of the incident complainled of on March
31 following, so that the bottle, if indeed it was one
purchased from Safeway Stores instead of one purchased from another source, was there from two or
three days prior to February 27th until March 31st,
except possibly for the duration of the birthday party,
a period of five weeks. On the evening of March 31st
the incident of which plaintiff complains occurred at
about 8:30 P.M. (D 8). The paper clip caused some
temporary discomfort, but nothing more.
The incident was never reported to Safeway Stores.
(D 15). Two or three days later, however, plaintiff did
go to see Mr. Day, Manager of the Bottling Company,
and took the bottle and one of the two paper clips involved "to show him what happened." (D 25-26). Nothing
further was done until the action was filed.
The plaintiff has no information bearing on his
claim one way or another and knows of no other fact
that is relevant or pertains to his claim which might
have a bearing thereon. (D 35-36) Although he was interrogated by his own attorney (D 46) at the deposition,
no additional facts were disclosed.
Obviously he has no direct evidence of any negligence by this defendant and no direct evidence that the
paper clip in question was in the bottle of Coca Cola
at the time it left the possession of this defendant, even
assuming that it was bottled by defendant Bottling Company, as seen1s probable, it must be conceded, in view
of the fact that the cap which plaintiff ren1oved (Exhibit 4) bears this defendant's name as bottler.
Proceedings.

After this defendant answered by
4
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general denial (R 7) the matter was set for pre-trial
conference on October 21, 1959, before the Honorable
Ray Van Cott, Jr., District Judge, and notice was given
counsel for all parties. At the time and place set for
the pre-trial counsel for both defendants appeated.
After waiting some thirty minutes, the court caused a
telephone call to be made to counsel for plaintiff and
through that call the court and counsel for def'endants
were advised that no appearance would be made at the
pre-trial conference for the plaintiff but that plaintiff
would stand on his complaint.
The Court thereupon proce'eded with the pre-trial
conference and counsel for this defendant advised the
Court that it had available and would present at the
trial evidence from which it would appear that the defendant used great care to prevent foreign bodies, including paper clips, from being present in Coca Cola
bottled by it and that under the deposition there was
ample opportunity for the introduction of the paper
clip after the bottle left the possession and conrol of
this defendant. The issues were discusS'ed and it was
pointed out to the Court that there was not tendered or
available any facts sufficient to take the case to the jury
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in view of the laws
of the State of Utah established by the decisions of this
Court, that there was no direct evidence of any negligence on this defendant's part with respect to its handling of the bottle and product in question and no evidence
sufficient to take the case to the jury that the bottle
was contaminated at the time it left this defendant's
hands, and that there was no bona fide issue presented,
either on the theory of violation of the statute relating
5
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to adulteration or of breach of warranty. The Motions
for Summary Judgment for this defendant and for defendant Safeway Stores were made and granted.
The plaintiff then made this appeal. No motion
to set aside th'e judgment and to set the matter again
for pre-trial conference were ever made or submitted,
and no affidavit was ever presented either to show any
excusabl'e neglect in failing to appear at the pre-trial
conference or that any evidence in addition to that contained in the deposition was available or that plaintiff
had available any evidence to controvert that tendered
at the pre-trial conference by the defendants.
On pages 3 and 5 of his brief, the plaintiff states
that if given an opportunity at the trial he would testify
as to certain additional facts which he claims would
aid his case. However, there is nothing in the record
to support this statement made in the brief. All of
these matters are dehors the record and are not entitled
to be considered.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The judgment below is presumed corr'ect, and
every reasonable intendment is indulged in favor of it;
the burden of affirmatively showing error is on appellant; and the judgment will be affirmed if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record.
2. The action was properly dismissed under Rule
41 (b), U.R.C.P., for plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
3. On the record this defendant is not liable to
plaintiff for breach of implied warranty.
6
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4. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, and there is no inference of negligence applicable
to this defendant.
5. '~Phis defendant is not liable to plaintiff for violation of the statutes relating to adulterated foods; there
is no proof tendered or available that the product was
adulterated while in the hands of this defendant.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. The judgment below is presumed correct,
and every reasonable intendment is indulged in favor
of it; the burden of affirmatively showing error is on
appellant; and the judgment will be affirmed if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on
the record.
This point is, of course, merely preliminary. The
law stated is a fundamental part of the law relating to
appeals. These rules are well establish'ed in the Law
of Utah, as elsewhere.
There is a presumption that the judgment of the
trial court was correct, and every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of it; the burden of affirmatively showing error is on the party complaining
thereof.
Palfreyman v. Bates and Rogers Construction
Company, 108 Utah 142, 158 P. 2d 132.
In the absence of anything in the record to the
contrary, the Supreme Court must presume that the
trial court properly directed judgment for defendant.
The only question, in absence of a Bill of Exceptions,
is whether pleadings will support the judgment, and
7
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where the answer pleaded a general denial and affirmative defens'e pleadings did support judgment.
Hutchison v. Smart, 51 Utah 172, 169 Pac. 166.
Every reasonable intendment ought to be indulged
in favor of the validity and correctness of the judgment
under review, and it will not be disturbed unl'ess the
appellant meets his burden of affirmatively showing
error.
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad
(1955), 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335.

Company

S'ee also:
Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 680.
Burton v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514.
Morever, even if it should appear that the judgment of the trial court could not be supported on the
theory or grounds assigned by the trial court, the judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any
l'egal ground or theory apparent on the record.
5 C.J.S., "Appeal and Error," Section 1464, Page
72.
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 Pac. 977.
Huntsman v. Huntsman, 56 Utah 609, 192 Pac.
368.
As will be hereinafter pointed out, the judgment of
the trial court can be supported on several theories and
grounds in addition to those assign'ed by the Court.

Point 2. The action was properly dismissed under
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., for plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
Rule 41 (b) provides,
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
8
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... the defendant may rnove for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against him ... "
It was held, in a Federal case decided before
Utah's adoption of the Rules, that where the plaintiff
failed to appear at a pre-trial hearing ordered by the
Court a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper.

Wisdom v. Texas Company (1939), 27 F. Supp.
922.
It is submitted that it is not fair either to defendants or to the trial court for a plaintiff to fail to appear
at a pretrial conference ordered by the Court for the
purpose of sirnplifying the issues and eliminating issues
which are not bona fide and for considering such other
matters as n1ay aid in the disposition of the action, and
then to have preserved for trial issues which would
have clearly been eliminated had he appeared and made
a full and frank disclosure as to the limitations of evidence available. N·either is it fair or proper or lawful
after such failure to appear that plaintiff be allowed,
dehors the record, the benefit of evidence stated in his
brief to be availabl'e but which was not disclosed at the
pre-trial nor contained in any affidavit in support of
any motion to be relieved of his default in failing to
appear at the pre-trial. To let the plaintiff profit from
his own default in this regard would violate established
principles relating to an appeal upon the record made,
and would certainly violate the entire spirit and purpose
of the Rules of Procedure.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgrnent below
must be affirmed on this ground, although not specifically relied on by the trial court in the rendering· of its
decision.
9
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Point 3. On the record this defendant is not liable
to plaintiff for breach of implied warranty.
A. Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim
against this defendant for breach of warranty: No notice
of breach is alleged.

By Section 68-3-2, U.C.A., 1953, the Legislature of
Utah, as the constitutionally established policy-making
agency of the State, has declared:
The statutes establish the laws of this State
respecting the subjects to which th·ey relate ...
This Court has held that in view of this statutory
provision the statutes on any particular subject are
mandatory and exclude the common law or rules under
the doctrine of Stare Decisis which are not in conformity with the statutory law of this state.
Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 Pac. 148.
In other words, when the Legislature of Utah by
statute declares the law and policy of the state with
respect to a particular subject or matter it preempts
the field and the courts are no longer free to follow any
other rule or law no matter how appealing it may be
to the judges thereof. The Legislature of Utah has declared the law on this subject:
"But if, after aceeptance of the goods, the
buyer fails to give notice to the Seller of the
breach of any promise or warranty within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought
· to know, of such breach, the seller shall not b'e
liable therefore." Section 60-3-9, U.C.A., 1953.
This Court has held that under the statute quoted
10
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ffi·

that tiiuely notice is a vital condition precedent to any
action for breach of warranty and that if the complaint
failed to allege that notice of breach of warranty had
been given prior to the c01nrnencement of the action,
the eomplaint was fatally defective and did not state
a cause of action or claim under breach of warranty.
Niawhinne)r v. Jens·en, 120 Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769.
Such is the general rule under the sales act.
77 C.J.S., "Sales," Section 339, Notes 37 and 39,
Pages 1226 and 1227.
77 C.J.S., "Sales," Section 361a, Page 1270, Note
11.
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act), 1931
Edition, Page 297, Note IIIb, and Page 296, Note
IIIe. Se-e also the Pocket Supplement of said
Notes.
In this case plaintiff did not allege any notice of
breach. He did not appear at the pre-trial or at any
tiine and request leave to arnend to allege notice of
breach. I-Iis cornplaint is fatally defective as a claim
for breach of warranty, and there is nothing to be proved
thereunder which would be sufficient to go to the jury.
Accordingly, the judgrnent below rnust be affirm·ed unless it can be overthrown under some other theory
that is not the case, as will be hereinafter considered.
'rhe failure of the complaint to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted can, of course, be considered
at any tirne to and including the trial on the rnerits.
Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P. In simplifying the issues under
Rule 16, it is, of course, proper to ·eliminate an issue
inadequately pleaded, where, as here, the plaintiff stands
11
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on his complaint.

B. As a matter of law, this defendant did not warrant to plaintiff the product involved, as there is no
privity of contract between them.
A brief consideration of some preliminary matters
should be helpful to the Court. First, we advert once
more to Section 68-3-2, U.C.A., 1953, declaring that the
statutes of Utah establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, as heretofore discussed. This principle of statutory law renders irrelevant the arguments on page 6 of plaintiff's brief as regards the historical development of the obligation of
warranty and its relationship to an action on the case
for deceit. In this connection it must be born in mind
that if plaintiff is to gain any comfort from any imagined relationship of this case to an action for deceit,
he must plead and prove this defendant's guilty knowledge of contamination, and this is nowhere claimed and
cannot be claimed. See
Anglo-California Trust Co.
223, 211 Pac. 991.

v.

Hall, 61 Utah

This statute also disposes of the arguments made
on pages 12 to 19, inclusive, of plaintiff's brief in which
plaintiff urges this court to turn its back on the Utah
statutes and declare either that a manufacturer's warranty "runs with the commodity," or, that a warranty
exists between the manufacturer and a remote buyer,
without regard to how many people have handled the
product or what time has lapsed between the manufacturer's surrender of control and possession and the
time the purchaser discovers a breach of warranty, be12
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cause "Public policy demands it." The Legislature of
Utah has declared public policy on this subject. That
is the particular prerogative of the Legislature under
our system of division of powers, and we apprehend
that this Court will not undertake to ursurp the Legislative prerogative no matter how earnestly solicted by
the plaintiff nor how sympathetically they may regard
the plaintiff and his alleged injuries.
A recent ( 1958) Rhode Island case is pertinent. In
an earlier decision th'e Supreme Court of Rhode Island
had held that privity of contract in the traditional forn1
is essential to the finding of any warranty under the
sales act. In
Wolfe v. S. H. Wintman Company, 139 Atla. 2d
84,
the plaintiff there urged upon the Court the same considerations as are urged by plaintiff here. The Court
said:
"If, as plaintiffs' seemed to suggest in oral
argument, it is desired that we reconsider and
overrule that case we can only say that we decline
to do so and repeat that if a mor'e enlightened
policy demands a change in the law, the Legislature and not this Court is the one to make it."
(Page 85)

Second, the Uniform Sales Act of Utah was copied
after the proposed uniform act and after the act was
adopted by several other states whose courts of last
resort had previously construed the provisions here involved. Under these circumstances, this court, under
familiar rules well established in Utah, is bound to follow the courts of the other states which construed the
13
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act prior to the time Utah's Legislature adopted it.
Generally, where statutes of other states are adopted, it
is assumed that the construction placed thereon by the
courts of that state prior to adoption is also adopted,
and a case decided by such a court is decisive of a question of construction of the statute.
Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 Pac. 959.
National City Bank v. National Bank, (Ill.) 132
N.E. 832, 22 A.L.R. 1153.
In re Ral'eigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 Pac. 705.
Jackson Land and Livestock Company v. State
Tax Commission, 123 Utah 411, 259 P. 2d 1084.
Lukish v. Utah Construction Company, 48 Utah
452, 160 Pac. 270.
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170,
97 P. 2d 937, 940.
Fuller-Toponce Truck Company v. Public Service
Commission, 99 Utah 28, 96 P. 2d 722, 725.
With these preliminary considerations in mind, let
us turn to the Utah statute on which plaintiff relies,
Section 60-1-15, U.C.A., 1953 (Section 15 of th'e Uniform
Act).
If this section is at all applicable, it is subdivision 4
(not quoted by plaintiff) which applies. It is as follows:
" ( 4) In the case of a contract to sell or the
sale of a specified article under its patent or other
tradename, there is no implied warranty as to
its fitness for any particular purpose."
See
Williams v. S. H. Kress Company, 291 P. 2d 662.
where the Washington Court in 1955 considred an es14
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sentially identical situation. There the plaintiff, in a
sefl-service store, picked up a bottle of "Aseptisol" which
was labeled as being useful as a mouthwash, and claimed
that it was unfit for use as a mouthwash and injurious
when so used. The Court held that this purchase fell
under paragraph 4 of Section 15 of the Act and that
there was no warranty.
However, the portion of the statute on which plaintiff relies (Page 7 of his brief, Section 60-1-15, U.C.A.,)
provides that
"Subject to the provisions of this title and
of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied
warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness
for any particular purpose of goods supplied
under a contract to sell or a sale except as follows : (Emphasis added.)
"(1) Where the buyer, expressly or hy implication makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required, and
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgm·ent (whether he is the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an in1plied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
such purpose." (Emphasis added.)

Note first, that this sales act expressly negatives any
implied warranty except as specifically provided by
statute. Note in the second place, that under paragraph
1 the implied warranty provided for arises only from
communication between the immediate buyer and seller
-those involved in the transaction in question-and not
a remote preceding transaction.
The second exception provided 1n paragraph 2 of
15
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that section is that "where goods are bought by description there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
of merchantable quality." Here we have no buying by description. Here the plaintiff-buyer himself picked up
from a self-service store the 'exact articles he desired to
purchase; he never provided the seller with a description of goods and asked the seller to fill his order according to the description. No warranty can be predicated
here on paragraph (2).
Turning now to the question of whether or not
privity is required in order for a warranty to arise, let
us consider very briefly the nature of an implied warranty under the Sales Act. While it is true that an implied warranty involves an obligation imposed by law,
yet the nature of the obligation is in contract and not
in tort. From the fact of the consummation of a contract of sale, the law implies a further collateral contract of warranty, unl'ess the parties otherwise agree.
See
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section
15, Note II c, Page 109 and Pocket Supplement.

Hence, if there is no contract between the parties the
law will imply no warranty between the parties. Whether
the warranty is regarded as contractual or merely a
legal obligation imposed by statute,under Utah Law
and under the statutes it arises only out of the fact of
a contract, and if there is no contract and no privity
then there is no implication of warranty. This is the
general law. See
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section
15, Note I, Page 106 and Pocket Supplen1ent;
16
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1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section
12, Note I, Page 86 and Pocket Supplement;
77 C.J.S., "Sales," 305 b, pages 1123, especially
page 1128, Notes 3 to 6.
Let us now consider what judicial precedent is available in and binding on this court with regard to the interpretation of the Sales Act as regards the requirement
of privity of contract in order to make an implied warranty effective. Utah adopted the Uniform Sales Act
in 1917. So far as we can ascertain only three courts
of last resort had had occasion to consider the problem
in jurisdictions where the Sales Act was in force. They
are Connecticut, Massachusetts and Maryland. The
courts of all three of these states held that privity of
contract is a necessary element in any action for breach
of implied warranty. See
W elhausen v. Charles Parker Company (Conn.
1910) 83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271.
Flaccomio v. Eysink, (Maryland 1916) 129 .Md.
367, 100 Atl. 510.
Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Association,
(Mass. 1912) 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95.
The Connecticut case concerned a gun, the Maryland
case whiskey, and the Massachusetts case food. However, it must be pointed out that the Sales Act applies
to all goods and merchandise and not just to food items.
It is comprehensive and preempts the entire field.
It must be conceded also that neither the Connecticut nor the Massachus·etts courts referred to the Sales
Act, but it must be presumed that the courts acted
regularly and made their decision in the light of the
17
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Sales Act then in force.
The Flaccomio case from
Maryland is exactly in point.
It is respectfully submitted that, inasmuch as these
cases were decided under the Sales Act by courts of
last resort of the states who had previously adopted
the Sales Act and prior to the time Utah enacted the
law, they are in point and state the law of Utah in this
regard.
However, as indicated, the majority rule of the
cases decided under the Sales Act are in accord and hold
that privity is a necessary prerequisite to any implied
warranty. See, in addition to the Rhode Island case of
Wolfe v. S. H. Wintman Company, supra, the following
cas'es:
Chysky v. Great Bros. Co., (N.Y.) 139 N.E. 576,
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Company, (Ida. 1922), 35 Ida. 231, 205 Pac. 11118,
Pelletier v. Dupont (Me. 1925), 128 Atl. 186, 39
A.L.R. 972,
Redman v. Borden's Farm Products Company
(N.Y. 1927), 177 N.E. 838,
Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Company
(R. I. 1929), 144 Atl. 884, 63 A.L.R. 334,
Nehi Bottling Con1pany v. Thomas, (Ky. 1930),
33 s. w. 2d 701,
Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling Works
1936), 98 S.W. 2d 113, following

(Tenn.

Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Company (Tenn.
1915), 179 S.W. 155 (specifically holding that the
Sales Act doesn't change the rule requiring privity for implied warranty),
18
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Nelson v. Armour Packing Company, (Ark. 1905 ),
90S.W. 288 (decided, however, prior to adoption
of the Sales Act),
Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy (D.C. Court of Appeals, 1939), 107 Fed. 2d 203,
Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Company
(Pa. 1943), 28 Atl. 913,
Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Company (N. H.
1942) 25 Atl. 2d 125,
Stave v. Giant Food Arcade (N. J. Law 1940), 16
Atl. 2d 460,
Bourcheix v. Willowbrook Dairy (N.Y. 1935)
268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617,
Whitethorn v. Nash-Finch Company ( S. D. 1940)
293 N.W. 859,
Paul v. McBride (Mich.) 263 N.W. 877, (as applied to a non-food item),
Greenberg v. Lorenz (N.Y. Appellate Division
1959) 183 N.Y. Supp. 2d 46,
Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms (Wis. 1952) 53
N.W. 2d 788, and
Wood v. General Electric Company (Ohio Supreme Court 1953) 112 N.E. 2d 8.
The plaintiff-appellant in his brief (p. 13) cites
a Texas case in support of his plea that this Court dispense with the requirement of privity of contract. However, T·exas has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act.
Again, on page 14 of his brief, the plaintiff cites
Parish v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Cmnpany, 177 N.Y. Supp. 2d 7,
from the municipal court of New York (a trial court)
19 .
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to the effect that no privity is necessary. Surely this can
have no weight in view of the fact that the New York
Court of Appeals has reached a contrary conclusion. See
Chysky v. Great Bros. Company, 235 N.Y. 468, 139
N.E~. 576.
The Court of Appeals there said:
"The general rule is that a manufacturer or
seller of food, or orther article of personal property, is not liable to third persons, under an implied warranty, who have no contractual relations
with him. The reason for this rule is that privity
of contract does not exist between the seller and
such third persons, and unless there is privity of
contract there can b'e no implied warranty."
The Chysky case was one of a nail found in a cake
-substantially identical with the case at Bar. So far
as we can ascertain it still states the Law of New York
as regards implied warranty.
Again on page 15 of his brief, the plaintiff cites an
Arizona cas·e
Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Cathey, 317 P.
2d 1047.
It is hardy authority for plaintiff's position here, for,
although Arizona has adopted the Uniform Sales Act,
the Arizona Court fell into the error of deciding the
case without any referenc·e to the statutory law of the
state, and followed the Texas comnwn law decision of
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W. 2d 828.
Again page 17 of his brief, plaintiff relies on the
Kansas case of
Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottling Com20
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pany, 332 P. 2d 258
as well as other Kansas cases cited. Unfortunately for
plaintiff, Kansas also has not adopted the Uniform
Sales Act.
A word needs to be said about the case of Williams
v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 284 S. W. 2d 53, cited
on page 18 of plaintiff's brief. Plaintiff cites the case
as if it were from the Supreme Court of Missouri.
That is not the case. It was decided by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, an intermediate court. :Moreover,
the conclusion reached by the Court upon the warranty
issue is best summed up in the following statement from
the case:
"Reasonable opportunity to tamper or adulterate having been shown, it was encumbant upon
the plaintiff to prove, directly or by circuinstantial evidence, that in fact there was no such tampering or adulteration."
It must be conceded that California and Washington
and some other states have in food cases dispensed with
privity in an implied warranty case under the Sales
Act, but it is submitted that the cases are poorly r·easoned
from a legal point of view, no matter what the court
may think of them as a matter of wise judicial legislation. It is our firm belief that under our form of
government judicial legislation is never wis'e. It can
only lead to confusion and in the end to the discrediting
of the judicial system.
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts
pleaded and admitted in the deposition, the plaintiff
cannot claim as against this defendant the benefit of
21
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an implied warranty because he made no contract with
this defendant, and privity of contract and the existence
of a sales contract between the parties is a necessary
prerequisite to the evoking of an implied warranty, and
here there is admittedly no such contract and no such
privity between plaintiff and this defendant.
C. The warranty, if any, speaks as of the date the
product left this defendant's possession, and there is no
evidence submitted or tendered to prove the breach of
warranty alleged.
It must be remembered that one bottle of Coca
Cola is like another and that so far as the particular
bottle of Coca Cola in question is concerned there is
nothing to show when it left the possession and control
of defendant's Bottling Company (assuming it was in
their possession and control) except that it must have
done so at some time prior to the evening when plaintiff
picked the bottle up from a stack in the Safeway Selfservice Store on February 24 or 25, 1959·. In view of
the well-known fact that large stores maintain storerooms where a stock of such items is maintained, and
the fact that this was during the wintertime when the
demand for beverages is naturally slower, it could have
been many many months, perhaps even years prior to
that date. At any rate, for at least four and a half
weeks, and in all probability much longer, the bottle was
out of the possession and control of defendant Bottling
Company.
In the absence of an express contract, a warranty
relates only to the time of sale and does not cover future
defects not in existence at the time of sale.
22
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77 C.J.S. "Sal'es," Section 321, Page 1172, Notes
33 to 35.
An implied warranty, if it exists with respect to a beverage, is only that it is fit for human consumption "when
the product leaves the control of the manufacturer or
bottler."
Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Company (Ill. Appeals) 98 N.E. 2d 164.
El Zarape Tortilla Factory v. Plant Food Corporation (Cal. Dist. Court of Appeals 1949) 203
P. 2d 13, Syllabus No. 11.
Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey (Ariz.
1957) 317 Pac. 2d 1094, syllabus 8. (Cited
by plaintiff on another point.)
Thus, even where there is a warranty it is only
that the product meets the terms of the warranty at the
time of the sale ; there is no warranty implied that the
produc is "tamper proof" after it leaves the man~tfac
turer's possession. This concept is implicit even in all
the cases which have permitted recovery under a warranty, and so far as we know or have been able to asvertain there is no case which has allowed a recovery
on the th'eory of warranty in the absence of adequate
proof that the product was unfit when it left the hands
of the defendant charged.
Apparently, the plaintiff here desires this Court
to indulge the plaintiff with a presumption that becaus'e
he found a paper clip in the bottle when he drank frorn
it on March 31, 1959, the paper clip was in the bottle
when it left the hands of the def'endant Bottling Cornpany some undetermined time prior thereto, which would
23
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be at least four and a half weeks and perhaps that many
months. There is no such presumption or inference
available to plaintiff under the law of Utah. The presumption in this regard is substantially the same as the
one which the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to have
applied in the case of
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Utah
(1950) 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660, 52 A.L.R. 2d
108.
More will be said of the Jordan case later.
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts
and circumstances of this case and the charges made in
the complaint upon which plaintiff relies, there is on
the contrary a very strong presumption that the bottle
was uncontaminated and unadulterated when it left the
possession and control of defendant Bottling Company.
This presumption arises from the following considerations.
In his complaint, the plaintiff charges this defendant, the manufacturer of beverages for human consumption, with the violation of Sections 4-20-3 and 4-20-5,
U.C.A., 1953, a criminal offense. He seeks to recover on
that ground as well as on the ground of breach of warranty. If the warranty was breached, then, ipso facto
this defendant is also guilty of the criminal offense.
Under these circumstances, a very strong presumption of innocence, in favor of legality and compliance with
law, and of rightful action and performance of duty
arises. This presumption applies in civil cases as well
as in criminal cases.
31 C.J.S., "Evidence," Section 130, Page 748;
24
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Section 134, Page 769; and Section 150 Page 840.
See also,
20 Am. J ur., "E.vidence," Section 221, Page 217
and Section 226, Page 221.

In said Section 221 of American Juris prudence it is said
"One of the strongest disputable presumptions known to the law is the presumption 'that
a person is innocent of crime.' This presumption
applies not only in criminal cases, but also in civil
cases where the commission of the crime con1es
collaterally in question."
This presumption has found familiar application
in Utah in the presumption against fraud,
Utah National Bank v. Nelson, 38 Utah 169, 111
Pac. 907,
and the presumption that persons living together as man
and wife ar'e legally married.
In re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143.
It is one of the most favored presumptions in the
law. See
I Jones on Evidence-Civil Cases, 4th Edition,
Section 12 and Section 101.
In the latter section the learned author says that
"Generally speaking, no legal presurnption is
so highly favored as that of innocence; ordinarily
substantially all other presumptions yield to it
in case of conflict."
If it should appear that one of two persons rnust
have violated a law or acted improperly the presumption of innocence attaches to the party defendant rather
25
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than to one who is a stranger and the innocence of a
party is preferred as a presumption to that of a stranger
to the action.
I Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2d EditionRevised) Section 361, Page 620.
However, entirely independent of the benefit of the
presumptions of innocence and legality, proof of the
presence of the paper clips in the bottle on the evening
of March 31st is not proof that they were in the bottle
when it left defendant Bottling Company's possession
five weeks or five months prior thereto, as the case may
be. There is no presumption and no inference that a fact
of this kind established as of March 31 also existed at
a time more than five we'eks prior thereto.
Many respectable authorities have declared that
mere proof of the existence of a present condition or
state of facts or proof of the existence of a condition or
state of facts at a given time, does not raise any presumption that the same condition or facts existed at a
prior date, since inference or presumptions of fact ordinarily do not run backward.
31 C.J.S., "Evidence," Section 140, Page 789 and
cases cited.
See also
Burrows v. Nash (Ore. 1953) 259 Pac. 2d 106,
syllabus 8.
However, it must be conceded that as applied to
smne facts and conditions, this rule cannot be logically
indulged, and a retroactive infer·ence of continued existence of a fact or condition can and probably 1nust be
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indulged in under some circumstances. For instance,
as Professor Wigmore comments, proof of the existence
of a mountain at a certain locality at a tim'e specified
certainly justifies the inference and presumption that
the nwuntain has been there at that spot for some time
previously. If, however, the mountain is of volcanic
origin the natur'e of the thing dictates that the preexistence of even that mountain cannot be indulged over
too long a time. I am sure that the members of this
court all recall that during the last thirty years in
:Mexico an entirely n'ew volcanic mountain of tremendous
size started with a wisp of smoke in a corn field and
grew within the course of four or five years.
The crux of the matter is the likelihood of an intervening change and th'e ease with which it can be
made in the given period of time.
Mr. Jus tics Wolfe, formerly of this Court, in the
case of
Jensen v. Logan City (1936), 89 Utah 347, 57 P.
2d 708,
has written what is probably a definitive discussion on
the subject with his usual careful and brilliant analysis.
In that case the plaintiff sought damages from Logan
City upon the theory, among others, that the City's
·employees had negligently placed fencing wire, which had
been detached from one post but remained attached at
the other end to another post, across a sidewalk and
that plaintiff had stumbled over the wire at 11 :30 o'clock
at night and fallen to his injury. Plaintiff testified and
other witness·es testified that the wire was on the sidewalk at the time he stumbled. The trial court took frmn
27
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the jury the question of negligence in placing the wire
in a dangerous position over the paved sidewalk. It
was argu'ed in behalf of the plaintiff that the fact that
the wire was seen to protrude at a later hour was evidence that it had been protruding at a previous time
earlier in the day when the City's employees had unfastened the wire from the first post and had been working with the fence in that vicinity.
This Court affirmed the trial court's action in removing this issue from th·e jury.
The City's employee testified that at the time earlier
in the day when he worked with the fence, he folded
th·e loosened portion back against the fastened portion
of the fence, passed the ends of the wire around the
post and then twisted the wire around itself with a pair
of pliers thus fastening the loose portion of the f•ence
back to the fixed portion. This Court held that under
these circumstances the court acted properly in taking
the issue from the jury. Mr. Justic·e Wolfe, speaking
for the Court, said:
"There is no evidence that the City initially
permitted it to protrude. The evidence that peopl·e later saw it so is not evidence from which
such inference can be drawn because such evidence is too remote. The intervention of third
persons or of natural forces acting on what might
have be·en initially a well fastened fence may
have disposed the fence to a position partially
across the paved portion of the sidewalk, and
unless there was evidence that it was so se·en
within a reasonable time after the actual fastening back of the doubled part, such evidence is not
probative of the fact that it was originally so
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left... In ensembles that have an inherent degree
of permanency, an inference may arise that they
were in the same state a certain time before,
but the greater the element of unstability inherent in the state of configuration, the greater the
probability of change and the n'earer in time to
the initiating of the condition must be the observation."
Mr. Justice Wolfe, considering the matter further,
also says:
""Whether an inference that a certain state
was initially created may be drawn from evidence
that it was seen in that state at a certain ti1ne
after initiation depends on the circu1nstances surrounding the establishment and existence of the
object whose states of being are in controversy,
together with the inh'erent ability or inability of
the object to resist changes or status. The probativeness of such evidence is somewhat a matter
for the trial court. If reasonable minds could
reasonably differ as to whether or not such evidence was too remote to have probative value,
the ruling of the lower court would not be disturbed whichever way that ruling went. In this
case, therefore, we are of the opinion that the
court did not err when it held that the evidence
of the state of affairs sometime after Kent fastened back th'e fence had no probative value on
the issue as to how the fence had reposed at the
time he fastened it... " (Emphasis added).
In this case, the learn'ed trial judge very properly
and reasonably concluded that from the fact of contamination on March 31 no presumption or inference
can be drawn that it was so contaminated while in the
hands of the defendant Bottling Company. Such was
the conclusion of this Court with respect to the con29
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dition of a bottle of Coca Cola in the case of Jordan v.
Coca Cola Bottling Company, supra, where the lapse
of time and the opportunity for intervention of third
parties and pranksters were substantially less than in
the cas'e now before this court. It will be ren1en1bered
that in the Jordan case, the plaintiff opened and started
to consume the bottle of Coca Cola while he was still on
the premises of the retailer from whom he had purchased
the same through the operation of a locked vending
machine. This case is indeed much stronger than th'e
Jordan case on the facts. Under these circumstances,
in the absence of any evidence tendered in the record
to show that the bottle had not been tampered with
since it left the possession of the defendant Bottling
Company, the ruling of the trial court in the exercise
of that court's discretion, should not be disturbed, as
there is no proof tendered suffici'ent to go to the jury on
th·e issue that the alleged warranty was breached at
the time the Coca Cola left this defendant's possession
and control. Prof'essor Wigmore also agrees that in
these matters trial judges must be given wide latitude of
discretion.
1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section
438, Page 517.

And, as noted in the Jordan case and in 1nany other
cases, it is common knowledge that the cap fron1 a
bottle of Coca Cola can, with only a little care, be removed and replaced in such a way as virtually to defy
detection.
It must be recalled that if plaintiff is to prevail
on breach of warranty, he n1ust have ·evidence to show
30
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not only that the paper clips were in the bottle when
he opened the same, but that they were in the bottle
while the bottle was in the possession and control of
defendant Bottling Company five weeks or more prior
thereto.
There is no presumption that a state of things found
to exist has existed for any considerable time before
being discovered; a presumption of continu'ed existence
or pre-existence will not determine the instant in which
the change took place. This, of course, is particularly
true where the state of things are susceptibl'e to easy
change. See
Boyd v. Buick Auto Company (Iowa) ,165 N.W.
908.
For each of the several reasons given, it is respectfully submitted that def'endant Bottling Company is
not liable to plaintiff for implied breach of warranty.
Point 4. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
applicable, and there is no inference of negligence applicable to this defendant.

Implicit in th·e plaiintiff's brief, on the question of
liability for negligence, is the admission by plaintiff
that he cannot recover here on the theory of negligence
unless he can prevail upon this Court to upset the establish:ed law of Utah and overrule the case of
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Utah,
(1950) 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660, 52 A.L.R.
2d 108.
(Plaintiff's brief, page 20). This should not be done.
Stability in the law is one of the prime requisites of an
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orderly society. Consequently when the law on a subject has been solemnly declared after full hearing and
what was undoubtedly a most exhaustive consideration
and discussion of the principles and authorities involved
within the court itself, the rule of stare decisis should
be followed in the absen~e of some showing of mistake
or oversight by the Court. The Court, no less than
other public officers and members of society, must be
bound by the law thus settled for this jurisdiction. This
principle has always guided this Court. Moreover, once
the law has b'een settled and declared, if changes are
desired the proper agency is the legislature and not
the courts ; the courts are bound to declare the law as
they find it and not to infringe the prerogative of the
legislature to create new law or to change old law.
As the Rhode Island court so recently said
"If a more enlightened policy demands a
change in the law the legislature and not this
court is the one to make it."
Wolfe v. S. H. Wintman Company (1958), 139
Atl. 2d 84.
There is, of course, no direct evidence of negligence
on the part of this defendant and plaintiff farther implicitly admits that he cannot recover except under the
doctrine of res ipsa ioquitur, which is not applicable
under the Jordan case. Also, it is apparent that plaintiff concedes that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
not applicable unless there is proof sufficient to go to
the jury that th'e Bottling Company has "exclusive control at the time the deleterious substance is introduced
into said bottle." (Plaintiff's brief, page 20).
It is submitted that the Jordan case not only estab32
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lishes the law of Utah, put that it is soundly reasoned
and deserves to be followed and reaffirmed.

~[,

The basis of this Court's decision in the Jordan case
is that proof of contamination existing in a bottle of
Coca Cola upon opening immediately after withdrawal
from a vending machine serviced on a daily basis by
defendant Bottling Company did not give rise to an
inference that the bottle was contaminated while in
defendant Bottling Company's possession and control,
where the machine was replenished from stock available
in a foreman's office and several people had keys to
the machine. The Court very properly refused to
indulge, under these circumstances, and in view of the
fact (of which both the majority and the minority opinion took notice) that the bottle is not "tamper proof"
and can be in a few moments op'ened, contaminated and
resealed in such a manner as practically to defy detection and without the contents loosing their effervescent
quality. The Court very properly recognized that in
this world mischief-makers and impractical practical
jokers are quite prevalent and that where, as in every
case of negligence, the ultimate burden of proof is on
the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot be indulged with the
benefit of a presumption that an opportunity for tampering has not resulted in tampering.

i~l

The Jordan case is in entire conformity with the
very carefully reasoned decision of this Court 1n the
case of

J ens·en v. Logan City, supra
and is supported thereby.
In the case at Bar, the plaintiff (Plaintiff's brief,
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page 21) seeks comfort from the unsupported statement
made in his brief that, if given an opportunity, the
plaintiff would testify that the bottle was hard to op'en
and that when opened it popped and fizzed, i.e. that its
effervescent qualities continued to his opening. In this
connection it is interesting to note that 'even in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Latimer in the Jordan
case it was recognized and even asserted that a Coca
Cola cap can be removed and replaced without detection
except by an expert and that a bottle must be left open
for some considerable length of time before th·e liquid
will lose its effervescent qualities. However this may
be, there is nothing in the record, either by tender of
evidence at the pre-trial or by affidavit in support of a
motion to set aside the judgment below or in plaintiff's
deposition to indicate that he would in fact so testify.
This is outside the record and not properly argued.
The rule of the Jordan case gains additional force
where, as here, the defendant Bottling Company is
charged with a criminal offense in preparing and s'elling
a contaminated beverage, and is therefore entitled to
the strong presumption of innocence and compliance
with law, as demonstrated under Point 3 C, supra. Before that presumption of innocence any retroactive inference or presumption which might otherwise be indulged in under the authorities reli'ed on by plaintiff
(and in which the presumption of innocence was not
raised or discussed) must give way, and accordingly
the Court below very properly refused to indulge an
infer·ence or presumption of adulteration while in the
possession and control of this defendant, where the only
evidence was evidence of adulteration on March 31st,
34
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I~

four and a half weeks or nwre after this defendant's
poss'ession and control ceased. The inference of negligence would have to be based upon another inference
or presun1ption that an established fact on March 31st
continued undisturbed through the preceding five weeks
and that th'e contamination occurred while the bottle
was in this defendant's possession and control. This
cannot be done.
The cases on the subject are myriad, and we cannot
pretend that we have read them all. However, we have
not found or read any case in which the retrospective
inference or presumption which plaintiff reqU'ests has
been indulged where the time lapse has been at least as
long as four and a half weeks and might be a matter
of months. In th'e cases discussed by plaintiff in his
brief in which the inference or presumption was indulged and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur accordingly
applied, the bottle was opened immediately upon its purchase by the consumer and whil'e still in the retailer's
place of business. Under these circumstances and in
view of the many opportunities for contamination shown
during those four or five weeks or more the bottle was
in plaintiff's possession it is r'easonable to assume, we
submit, that even Mr. Justice Latimer would join in
denying the application of res ipsa loquitur, especially
in the light of the presumption of innocence and in the
light of this Court's discussion of retrospective inferences in the case of
Jensen v. Logan City, supra.
Plaintiff cites and quotes from sOine cases which
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor under facts like
those in the Jordan case. Some of them, such as the
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exploding bottle cases, are not in point, as tampering
with the bottle by opening and resealing it would d~
crease rather than increase the pressure of the carbon
dioxide gas in the beverage and henc·e decrease rather
than increase the likelihood of an explosion. This is
clear because the pressure of the gas is and must be
the only source of power or force for a bottle explosion.
Other cases which are in point are balanced by recent
cases decided by courts quite as respectable and in
which the doctrine of the Jordan case has been followed
and the application of res ipsa loquitur refused.
Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Byrne
(Ky. 1953) 258 S.W. 2d 475.
Sharpe v. Danville Coca Cola Bottling Company
(Ill. Appeals) 132 N.E. 2d 442.
An analygous Utah case is
Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company (1955)
3 Utah 2d 283, 282 Pac. 2d 1044.
It should also be observed that at the pre-trial conference defendant Bottling Company tendered evidence
to which plaintiff tendered no rebuttal, and which it is
submitted could not be rebutted in the light of the
record, to the effect that the Company and its ·employees
had used great care in the conduct of its bottling business to prevent any foreign object whatsoever from
getting into or remaining in any Coca Cola bottle or the
beverage which it placed therein. Its machinery and
procedures as was stated to the trial court are substantially those outlined in the Jordan case, supra, except for the employnwnt of the automatic electric eye
rej'ector. Its procedures have proved adequate in the
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bottling of literally n1illions of bottles of Coca Cola insofar as the prevention of contamination are concerned.
In the simplification of the issues under Rule 16,
U.R.C.P., it is respectfully submitted that it was quite
proper for the trial court, upon consideration of this
tender of evidence and no rebuttal being tendered, to
conclude that reasonable minds could not differ on the
question of due care by this defendant and that there
was no bona fide issue on the question of negligence
so that on this ground the trial court was justified in
concluding that there was nothing to submit to the
jury on the issue of this defendant's negligence.
Even where indulged, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not shift the ultimate burden of proof,
and the inference arising th·erefrom disappears when
met by competent evidence.
Olmstead v. Oregon Shortline R. Co.
27 Utah 515, 76 Pac. 575.
Such action is well within the power of the trial
court under Rule 16. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that at th'e· pre-trial conference the Court
may compel parties to agree as to all facts concerning
which there can be no real dispute.
Berger v. Brannon (1949) 172 Fed. 2d 241.
As this case was decided prior to Utah's adoption of
the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, it is an established
and legal precedent for this court. Certainly, in narrowing the issues and preparing for trial the trial court
must have power to withdraw issues as to which there
is no real controversy. If parties are permitted to insist on the trial of issues as to which they have no evi37
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dence, and where the ultimate burden of proof is upon
them, then one of the primary purposes of Rule 16 is
def·eated and aborted.
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff has no claim against this defendant based on negligence and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
applicable.
Point 5. This defendant is not liable to plaintiff
for violation of the statutes relating to adulterated
foods; there is no proof tendered or available that the
product was adulterated while in the hands of this defendant.

The arguments and authorities cited under Points
3 and 4, we believe, effectively dispose of plaintiff's contention that defendant Bottling Company is liable for
violation of the Utah statutes prohibiting Inanufacture
or sale of adulterated food products.
First, this defendant has the benefit, especially as
against this charge, of the strong presumptions of innocence and legality in th:e conduct of its business, and
actual violation of the statute by this defendant must be
affirmatively proved as against these strong presumptions.
Johnson v. Stoddard (:Mass. 1941), 37 N.E. 2d 505.
Hopki~s v. Antorg Trading Corporation, 38
N.Y.S. 2d 788.
Tedder v. Coca Cola Bottling Cmnpany (S.C.)
77 S.E. 2d 293.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not available
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to aid plaintiff on this theory of absolute liability for
violation of statute, as it is peculiar to the law of negligence.
65 C.J.S., "Negligence," Section 220 (3), Page
995, Note 13.
Moreover, even if the doctrine were applicable ]n
an action based on the statute imposing absolute liability, it cannot be indulged here because, as demonstrated hereinbefore under the law of Utah as exemplifred in the Jensen v. Logan City case, supra, and the
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company case, supra,
there is no retrospective inference that the paper clip
was in the bottle in question while the bottle was in
the possession and control of this defendant approximately five weeks or more prior to its discovery by
plaintiff. The time lag and the opportunities for tampering or substitution are too great, either in the Safeway
Self-service Store where the bottle was set out and
available to the public at large, at the plaintiff's birthday party, or in his fruit-room which was frequently left
open.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion perhaps a word should be said about
the general philosophy of liability. Plaintiff, in his
brief, quotes extensively from Harper and James on
The Law of Torts. The whole burden and philosophy
of the writing of these eminent professors refle~ their
own philosophical conviction that the burden.(injury
should be distributed throughout society and shared by
all, irrespective of fault on the part of those asked to
contribute. It would seen1 that the devotion of a life39
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time to teaching instead of to participation in the actual
workings of a modern civilization has led these authors
into an ultra-liberal philosophy that "everybody should
share and share alike, and the burden of injuries as
well as the benefits of wealth should be distributed by
the courts without regard to the deserts of the claimant
or the fault of the claimee." This is i1nplicit in their
entire discussion of "fault as a basis of liability."
2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Section 12.1

and following.
Accordingly, in their selection of cases and in their
emphasis these learned professors have actively sought
to impose their philosophy on their readers, and through
their readers on society. This is, of course, their privilege under the Constitution, but certainly in evaluating
their writings the Court should consider the circumstances, and should consider that in taking this extremely lib'eral view the professors have not in fact advanced the cause of justice, but have retreated to the
most primitive type of justice, as exemplified in very
·early "Case of the Thorns", Y.B. 6 d. IV 7, pl. 18 (1466):
"For though a man do'eth a lawful thing, yet if any damage do thereby befall another, ye shall answer for it.
. . . If a man shoot at butts and hurt another unawares,
an action lies ... if a man assault me, and I lift up my
staff to defend myself and in lifting it up hit another,
an action lies by that person, and yet I did a lawful
thing. And the reason of all these cases is, because he
that is damaged ought to be recompensed ... "
This is the philosophy of Professors Harper and
James. It is not the law of Utah nor, it is submitted
(except in statutory cases like Workmen's Compensa40
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tion) does it s'eenl to be the law anywhere except in those
limited jurisdictions and fields where the "share the
wealth philosophers" have succeeded in imposing their
theories of "communism of liability."
In an imperfect world the law of averages dictates
that some damage and hurt is occasionally inevitable,
and we must all take our chances. Under any theory
of western justice one should not be required to share
his wealth with another, just because the other has been
unfortunate and suffered an injury. This sharing may
be Christian Charity, but it is not law, and it is not
justice.
As the Rhode Island court indicated, if the plaintiff
here and Messrs. Harper and James desire to change
our concept of justice and our law, th'ey should address
themselves to the legislatures and not to the courts who
are sworn to uphold the law as written.
It is respectfully submitted that as a matter of
law and justice, the plaintiff has no claim against this
defendant and th'e judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Paul Thatcher,
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Defendant
Coca Cola Bottling Company
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Mailed 3 copies of the within Brief to Rawlings,
Wallace, _Roberts & Black, and John L. Black, Attorneys
for Appellant, 530 Judge- Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and to Ray, Quinney, & Nebeker, and Stephen B. Nebeker, Attorneys for Respondent, Safeway Stores, Inc.,
Deseret Bldg., Salt Lake City 11, Utah, this _______________________ _
day of March, 19·60.

Couns·el for Respondent,
Coca Cola Bottling Company
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